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PAGE 02

NC 28825

TOR:161832Z MAY 74

SHOULD BE VIGILANT IN OPPOSING MBFR I ARRANGEMENTS - EITHER CONSTRAINTS OR VERIFICATION - THAT WOULD SMACK OF A CENTRAL EUROPEAN SPECIAL DISARMAMENT ZONE LIMITED ESSENTIALLY TO THE TWO GERMANIES. WHILE DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS OCCASIONALLY ARGUE THE MERITS OF OVERT VERIFICATION WITH US ON MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE GROUNDS, AUTHORITATIVE DEFMIN OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGE THE FONOFF POSITION THAT SUCH VERIFICATION WOULD BE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE IN PHASE I, 2. OF LATE, VAN WELL HAS SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE PERSONALLY ENGAGED ON THESE ISSUES. IN MAY 3 TALK WITH DEAN, VAN WELL VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED GOING BEYOND NTM - EXIT/REENTRY POINT PACKAGE IN MBFR I. IN SAME CONVERSATION, WITH VAN WELL NODDING HIS AGREEMENT, RUTH TERMED PERMANENT MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS IN MBFR I "SIMPLY UNACCEPTABLE TO BONN."

IN MAY 15 TALK WITH THE AMBASSADOR ON UNRELATED MATTERS, VAN WELL RAISED THE TOPIC OF CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES, MAKING THE POINT THAT IT IS OF "GREAT IMPORTANCE" TO THE FRG THAT CBM'S HAVE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE GEOGRAPHICAL APPLICATION IN ORDER TO DISSIPATE THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL ZONE. VAN WELL TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT CBM'S ARE IMPORTANT TO BONN AND THE FRG "DOES NOT WISH TO MORTGAGE THE FUTURE OF EUROPE BY ATTACHING UNDUE IMPORTANCE TO TERRITORY," BUT THE GEOGRAPHICAL ISSUE IS AN ESSENTIAL ONE FOR BONN - BOTH IN CSCE AND MBFR. IN SEPARATE RECENT TALKS WITH EMBOFF, RUTH HAS BEEN RECALLING THE IMPORTANCE OF TREATING THE HUNGARIAN QUESTION IN AN MBFR NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND/OR NON-INCREASE OF FORCES AGREEMENT IN ORDER FURTHER TO DILUTE THE AREA PROBLEM. THIS SAME GERMAN SENSITIVITY ON THE AREA ISSUE ALSO COMES THROUGH IN THE EVER MORE CAUTIOUS COMMENTS OF RUTH AND ROTH ON STABILIZING MEASURES (BONN 5334) A. IN ALL OF OUR RECENT CONTACTS, THREE POINTS HAVE MATERIALIZED AS THE GRAVAMEN OF GERMAN THINKING. FIRST, GIVEN POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND THE FACT THAT REDUCTIONS

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PAGE 03

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TOR:161834Z MAY 74

R 161756Z MAY 74
 FM AMEMBASSY BONN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2593
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
 INFO RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6966
 RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 2638
 RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS 2646
 RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3543
 BT

S E C R E T (SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 07894)

AND CONSTRAINTS WILL BE LIMITED TO U.S./SOVIET FORCES IN PHASE I, THERE SHOULD BE ONLY AS MUCH VERIFICATION AS NECESSARY RATHER THAN AS MUCH AS NEGOTIABLE. SECOND, THE CHARACTER OF MBFR II WILL BE QUITE DIFFERENT THAN MBFR I, THUS PERMITTING SOMEWHAT MORE ELABORATE ASSOCIATED MEASURES, INCLUDING VERIFICATION, IN PHASE II. THIRD, THE FRG NEEDS U.S. ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING NTM, EXIT/REENTRY POINTS AND RESTRICTIONS OF VERIFICATION TO GERMAN TERRITORY BEFORE CONCLUDING DEFINITIVELY "HOW LITTLE VERIFICATION IS ENOUGH." WE DO NOT EXPECT MUCH FRG MOVEMENT ON THE SUBSTANCE OF VERIFICATION ISSUES BEFORE THE USG IS IN A POSITION TO INFORM THE GERMANS WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT EXIT/REENTRY POINT ARRANGEMENTS, AS SUPPLEMENTED BY NTM, ARE OR ARE NOT OBJECTIVELY ADEQUATE FOR MBFR I. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT FRG IS ALSO ENGAGED IN ITS OWN STUDIES ON THESE MATTERS. BONN ALSO WILL WISH TO HEAR FURTHER FROM THE U.S. CONCERNING THE NTM PARTICIPATION AND ROTTERDAM QUESTIONS.

THE NECESSITY OF ADDITIONAL OVERT MEASURES FOR PHASE I, WE WOULD EXPECT THE FRG TO MAINTAIN ITS POSITION THAT FURTHER VERIFICATION OF POST-WITHDRAWAL FORCE LEVELS SHOULD BE DEFERRED UNTIL MBFR II. VAN WELL AND ROTH STRONGLY WISH TO AVOID BUNDESTAG RATIFICATION PROCEEDINGS IN CONNECTION WITH THE FIRST AGREEMENT AND FEAR THAT INTRODUCING MORE POST-WITHDRAWAL VERIFICATION IN THE FRG COULD IN POLITICAL TERMS REQUIRE BUNDESTAG ASSENT AND THUS ENGENDER A POTENTIALLY FRACTIOUS PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE.

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TOR:161834Z MAY 74

6. THE GERMANS DO NOT BELIEVE THEIR PROPOSALS DISPENSE WITH OVERT VERIFICATION ONCE WITHDRAWALS HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THEY THINK THE NTM-EXIT/REENTRY PACKAGE IS OBJECTIVELY SUFFICIENT AND POLITICALLY TOLERABLE FOR MBFR I, AND, IN ANY CASE, REPRESENTS THE OUTSIDE LIMITS OF SOVIET READINESS TO COMPROMISE. IN THIS SENSE, AND GIVEN THE FACT THAT AN MBFR I COMPACT WOULD NOT ENTAIL VERIFICATION OF SOVIET TERRITORY, THE GERMANS PROFESS NOT TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE U.S. IS PRESSING FOR FURTHER OVERT INSPECTION.

7. AS MENTIONED BY U.S.NATO (REF A - PARA 6), ROTH AND OTHER FRG AUTHORITIES OCCASIONALLY HAVE REFERRED TO THE CONCEPT OF INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE. BUT THE GERMAN IDEA IS TO CRANK UP SUCH A CHALLENGE MACHINERY ONLY AFTER SUPPORTING EVIDENCE OF A VIOLATION HAD BEEN MARSHALLED AND DISCUSSIONS BY A SALT STYLE STANDING CONTROL COMMISSION HAD PROVED FUTILE. U.S.NATO'S PROPOSALS IN PARAS 6 AND 7 ARE, IN OUR VIEW, UNLIKELY TO TEMPT BONN IN TERMS OF PHASE I.

8. WE EVEN MORE CONVINCED THAT THE GERMANS WOULD CONSIDER U.S. ASSURANCES REGARDING THE TEMPORARY CHARACTER OF MOBILE INSPECTION (REF A - PARA 8, 9 AND 10) UNACCEPTABLE IN PHASE I. AND LIKE U.S.NATO (PARA 11), WE TEND TO WONDER IF SUCH ASSURANCES WOULD NOT ACTUALLY UNDERMINE THE EFFICIENCY OF VERIFICATION MEASURES THE U.S. WOULD BE WORKING SO HARD TO SELL - FIRST TO BONN AND, IF SUCCESSFUL, THEREAFTER TO MOSCOW.

9. FURTHER ON THE MOBILE TEAM POINT, RUTH HAS TOLD US

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AM 20028

TOR:161835Z MAY 74

R 161756Z MAY 74
 FM AMEMBASSY BONN
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2594
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
 INFO RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6967
 RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 2639
 RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS 2647
 RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3544

BT

S E C R E T [SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 07894]

THAT THE BELGIANS HAVE VOICED SOME UNDERSTANDING TO HIM REFRG WISH TO DEFER THE ISSUE UNTIL PHASE II. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY SOUGHT TO PERSUADE THE GERMANS TO SUPPORT THE BRITISH IDEA - I.E., THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD PROPOSE BOTH FIXED AND MOBILE VERIFICATION TEAMS TO THE SOVIETS AND BE PREPARED TO SETTLE FOR ONLY FIXED POSTS IF, AS IS LIKELY, THE WARSAW PACT REJECTS MOBILE TEAMS. THE GERMAN REACTION HAS USUALLY BEEN - "OK, BUT IT MUST BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THAT THE WEST WILL REJECT MOBILE VERIFICATION OF POST MBFR I FORCE LEVELS SHOULD THE PACT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL." LATELY, GIVEN THE AUGMENTED POLICY LEVEL OPPOSITION TO SUCH PHASE I OVERT VERIFICATION, EVEN THE "OK, BUT" APPROACH HAS BECOME BLURRED. ON THE OTHER HAND, GIVEN THE REPORTED BELGIAN COMMENTS TO RUTH ON THE MOBILE TEAM ISSUE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME TACTICAL VARIATION OF THE U.S.-NATO PROPOSAL IN REF A - PARA 14 MIGHT WORK. 10. IN SUM, FRG POLICY MAKERS AND MBFR EXPERTS ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT AN NTM/EXIT-REENTRY PACKAGE TO VERIFY POST-WITHDRAWAL U.S./SOVIET FORCE LEVELS FOLLOWING MBFR-I. BARRING HIGHLY PERSUASIVE U.S. REPLIES TO FRG QUESTIONS ON THESE ISSUES, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY BONN WOULD ASSENT TO BROADENING SIGNIFICANTLY THE SCOPE OF SUCH MEASURES. BUT VAN WELL, ROTH AND RUTH HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED A READINESS TO CONSIDER MORE ELABORATE MEASURES - PARTICULARLY THE INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE IDEA - IN MBFR-II. THIS REPRESENTS NO ASSURANCE CONCERNING MBFR-II VERIFICATION, BUT SOME GERMAN OFFICIALS ARE SKEPTICAL AS TO WHETHER MBFR-II

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NC 28828

TOR:161835Z MAY 74

WILL EVER ARRIVE, AND PENDING MBFR II, BONN IS ARGUING
 AGAINST POLITICALLY ENTANGLING ENGAGEMENTS REGARDING
 GERMAN TERRITORY.
 HILLENBRAND